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Executive Summary 
There are a number of proposals being circulated that are ostensibly designed to help low-income 
homeowners who are facing foreclosure. This paper points out that these rescue packages actually 
will provide little benefit to moderate income homeowners. The major beneficiaries of these plans 
are likely to be banks and other current holders of bad mortgage debt, who may earn tens of billions 
of dollars at taxpayer expense. 
 
The paper notes that: 
 
• Under most of these plans, it is highly unlikely that homeowners will accumulate any equity 
in their homes. For example, under the proposal put forward by the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, homeowners may have to see increases in the current value of their home by 10 
percent or more before they have earned any equity. This seems very unlikely since house 
prices are currently falling at double-digit rates and the median period of homeownership for 
low-income families is less than four years. 
 
• During the period that they remain in their home, monthly housing payments for the 
homeowners who are helped under these plans are likely to be close to 85 percent higher 
than what they would be if the homeowner rented a comparable unit. If low- and moderate-
income homeowners would ordinarily spend 30 percent of their income on shelter costs, the 
excess costs incurred as a result of this plan are the equivalent of an additional 26 percentage 
point income tax imposed on the families who are part of this program.  
 
• Foreclosure rates are likely to continue to be high for the families who benefit from these 
plans, since most will still have zero equity in their home and little prospect for acquiring 
equity. The paper shows that if the foreclosure rate ends up being 10 percent, then the losses 
to the government will be close to 2.5 percent of the money made available for the bailout. 
If the foreclosure rate is 20 percent, then the losses will be 7.5 percent of the money used in 
the bailout, and if it is 30 percent, then the losses will be 15 percent of the money made 
available for the bailout. 
 
• The cost per homeowner benefited is likely to be quite high, since many of the homeowners 
covered by such a plan likely would have held onto their homes in any case. For example, in 
the optimistic case where only 10 percent of the loans end up in foreclosure, the cost for 
each additional family who remains a homeowner will be more than $8,000. In the case of a 
20 percent foreclosure rate, the cost per additional homeowner will be $30,000, and in the 
case where the foreclosure rate is 30 percent, the cost for each additional homeowner who 
remains in their home will be $75,000.  
 
This implies a very high cost in taxpayer dollars for a very questionable benefit. By comparison, the 
government can pay for a year’s worth of child care for not much more than $6,000 or a year of 
health care for $3,000. 
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The paper suggests more narrowly directed policies as an alternative. In particular, if foreclosure 
rules were temporarily altered, to give moderate-income homeowners facing foreclosure the option 
to rent their home at the fair market rent, it would provide a large element of security to the millions 
of moderate-income families at risk of losing their home. Furthermore, this temporary change in 
foreclosure rules would provide a very strong incentive to lenders (who do not want to become 
landlords) to negotiate terms under which homeowners can stay in their house as homeowners. This 
plan also has the advantage that it requires no government money and no new bureaucracy. 
 
Subprime Rescue Plans: Backdoor Bank Bailouts 
There is growing support in political circles for a large-scale proposal to bail out families with 
subprime mortgages who are at risk of losing their homes. In the last week, two prominent 
economists, former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers and Alan Blinder, who had been Vice-
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, both joined the bailout bandwagon, the newest in a long list 
of politicians and pundits who had previously endorsed plans for bailouts. 
 
However, before Congress puts hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars at risk, it is important to ask 
what these plans are intended to accomplish and who they are designed to help. While the stated 
purpose of these bailout plans is to help homeowners, many of whom were victimized by predatory 
mortgages, the main beneficiaries are likely to be banks and other investors who made bad 
investment decisions.  
 
This basic point can be seen by examining the plan put forward by the Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS), which has featured prominently in recent discussions and is typical of the sort of proposal 
being put forward. This plan recognizes that many homeowners are now underwater, owing more 
on their mortgages than the value of their house. This is the main factor leading to the record 
foreclosure rates of recent months.  
 
When a mortgage is underwater, the homeowner has no equity against which to borrow to allow 
him to make mortgage payments during bad times. Homeowners with underwater mortgages also 
have a large incentive to simply walk away from their home, turning it over to the bank, since the 
mortgage debt is greater than the value of the home.  
 
Under the OTS plan, the mortgage would be broken up into two parts. A new mortgage, equal to 
current value of the home, would be issued and guaranteed by the government, through the Federal 
Housing Authority (FHA). The second part of the mortgage would take the form of a tradable 
certificate. The face value of the certificate would be equal to the difference between the original 
mortgage and the current value of the home. This certificate would be a claim against any equity (up 
to the face value of the certificate) in excess of the debt remaining on the new mortgage. This is the 
money that homeowner would otherwise pocket when they sell their home. 
 
The proponents of this plan suggest that this is a win-win scenario in which the housing market is 
stabilized, homeowners facing foreclosure are allowed to keep their house, and the taxpayer is left 
unharmed. In fact, the homeowners “helped” under this plan are likely to see no benefit, and the 
taxpayers are likely to incur substantial liability. 
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From the standpoint of the homeowner, they are likely to be kept in a situation wherein they own a 
home in which they have zero equity. Furthermore, they have very little chance of gaining any equity 
before they sell their home. In addition, they are likely to be paying substantially more in mortgage 
payments and other ownership related costs than they would if they were to rent a comparable unit. 
 
This situation can be easily explained using the example that the OTS highlighted in its description 
of the bailout plan. The OTS assumed that a homeowner had a mortgage for $220,000 on a home 
that is currently worth $200,000. In this case, a new mortgage for $200,000 would be issued by a 
bank and guaranteed by the FHA. The current mortgage holder would get a check for $200,000, and 
a certificate that is worth up to $20,000 that is a claim against money collected by the homeowner 
when he sells his home. This means that the homeowner will not be able to earn any equity when he 
sells his house unless the price increases by at least 10 percent from its current level.  
 
Prices have been dropping at more than a 16 percent annual rate, so there will have to be a huge 
turnaround in the housing market before homeowners will have any equity whatsoever under this 
plan.1 With the median period of homeownership for moderate income families less than 4 years, it 
is unlikely that most of the homeowners who fall under this plan will ever acquire any equity in their 
home.2 In the OTS example, a homeowner who gets a 30-year fixed rate mortgage at 6 percent 
interest will have accumulated less than $15,000 in equity after 5 years, which means that even if 
prices just stayed flat, the house price would still be $5,000 too low to give them any equity after the 
certificate is paid off.   
 
Over this five-year ownership period, the homeowner’s mortgage and ownership costs are also likely 
to be far more than their rent on a comparable unit in the same neighborhood. Suppose that the 
ratio of the sales price to annual rent is 20 to 1, which would be common given the extraordinary 
run-up in house prices over the last decade. If we assume, again using the numbers from the OTS 
example, a homeowner gets a 6 percent fixed-rate mortgage, and has property tax and maintenance 
payments each equal to 1 percent of the house value, then the total payments would be 9.3 percent 
of the house price or $1,541 per month. By comparison, the rent payments on a comparable unit 
would be just $830 per month. This comparison is shown in Figure 1. 
 
In this particular example, the monthly cost of owning is 85 percent higher than the cost of renting. 
If these families would ordinarily spend 30 percent of their income on shelter costs (the overall 
average), then the excess payments under this plan are equivalent to a 26 percentage point tax on the 
income of the families who take part in this program. This is driven primarily by the high ratio of 
sales price to rent. Until this ratio adjusts to more normal levels, most families are likely to be hurt 
by owning. The situation is especially bad for homeowners who enter into a bailout arrangement like 
that laid out by OTS, since the certificate held by the initial mortgage issuer, giving them first claim 
on any equity built up by the homeowner, virtually guarantees that most homeowners will never 
accumulate equity in their home. As a result, their higher monthly housing payments are simply 
wasted. 
                                                 
 
1
 The Case-Shiller index showed house prices dropping at a 16.2 percent annual rate from the third quarter to the fourth 
quarter of 2007. The National Realtors Association data for existing homes sales showed that the median house price 
nationwide was declining at a 14.5 percent annual rate in the three months ending in January compared with prior 
three months.  
2
 This is taken from an analysis of new homebuyers using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, see Reid, C. 
2004 “Achieving the American Dream? A Longitudinal Analysis of the Homeownership Experience of Low-Income 
Families,” Department of Geography, University of Washington. 
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FIGURE 1 
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Source: Author’s calculations, see text.  
 
The homeowners are likely to not be the only losers in this story. The taxpayers are obligated to 
guarantee the value of the new mortgage. If the guarantee fee is set at the right level, then the 
homeowners would cover the cost of the guarantee (this guarantee fee, along with other transactions 
costs associated with issuing the second mortgage will further cut into any potential for the 
homeowner to acquire any equity). However, it is quite likely that the fees charged to homeowners 
will be too little to cover the cost of defaults, especially if house prices keep falling.  
 
Even in an optimistic scenario, there is likely to be a high default rate, since homeowners will not 
have any equity in their house until they have lived there for several years. A default rate of 10 
percent over the life of the mortgage (this is a bit more than half of the one-year default rate on 
subprime loans at present), is probably an optimistic scenario.  
 
In this optimistic case, where house prices do not fall, the loss on a default is likely to be in the range 
of 25 percent.3 A more extreme case, in which house prices drop an average of 20 percent, is likely 
to produce far higher default rates and much greater losses on each default. Suppose in this case that 
the default rate is 30 percent and the average loss per foreclosure is 50 percent of the initial 
mortgage value. Finally, we can construct an intermediate scenario with a default rate of 20 percent 
and an average loss of 37.5 percent of the initial loan value.  
 
Figure 2 shows the losses as a percentage of the amount of money used in the guarantee fund. In 
the optimistic scenario, the government would lose 2.5 percent of the money it puts into a guarantee 
fund. This means that if it puts $100 billion into the fund, then it will eventually lose $2.5 billion on 
defaults. In the pessimistic scenario it will lose 15 percent of the money that it puts into the fund. In 
this case, a $100 billion fund would imply losses of $15 billion. In the middle scenario, the losses 
would be 7.5 percent of the money put into the fund, so that a $100 billion fund would incur losses 
                                                 
 
3
 This is based on an estimate from GMAC-RFC, one of the country’s largest issuers of mortgage backed securities, that 
the average foreclosure led to a loss of $50,000. This is cited in Hatcher, D. 2006 “Foreclosure Alternatives: A Case for 
Preserving Home Ownership,” Economic Development, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Page 1.  
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FIGURE 2 
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Source: Author’s calculations, see text. 
 
of $7.5 billion. (In addition, the transactions costs associated with this program, which are likely to 
run in the range of 1.0-2.0 percent of the amount guaranteed would be a further loss associated with 
the program.) 
 
By comparison with these sums, Congress had a major debate over an expansion of the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), which would have cost $7.0 billion annually. This is 
equal to three times the loss in the optimistic scenario and slightly less than the $7.5 billion loss in 
the middle scenario. The annual cost of the expansion of the SCHIP program is less than half of the 
$15 billion loss in the pessimistic scenario, which means that the losses in this case would be 
sufficient to fund the expansion for two full years. In short, the potential losses to taxpayers in the 
type of loan guarantee program laid out by OTS are substantial compared to other items that have 
been major topics of public debate. 
 
It is also worth considering the size of the losses to relative to the number of people who are able to 
stay in their home as a result of this bailout plan (recognizing that many homeowners might still be 
better off leaving, even with the plan.) Clearly some number of homeowners would manage to stay 
in their home regardless. Assuming that 30 percent of these homeowners would have been able to 
hold onto their houses even without this plan, then it is possible to calculate the percentage of 
homeowners who able to keep their homes as a result of this bailout plan in each of the three 
scenarios described above. In the optimistic scenario, in which 10 percent of homeowners covered 
by the plan default, 60 percent of the homeowners covered by the plan are able to stay in their home 
as a result of the plan. In the middle scenario, in which 20 percent of the homeowners default, the 
share is 50 percent, and in the pessimistic scenario in which 30 percent of homeowners default, only 
40 percent of the homeowners covered by the plan are able to stay in their homes as a result of the 
plan.  
 
Figure 3 shows the cost per retained homeowner in each of these three scenarios. In the optimistic 
scenario, it costs $8,300 for each homeowner who is kept in their house as a result of this plan, more 
than enough to pay for health care for a kid for two years. In the middle scenario, the cost to the 
taxpayers is $30,000 for each homeowner kept in their house. In the pessimistic scenario, the cost to 
the taxpayers is $75,000 for each homeowner kept in their house as a result of this plan, enough to  
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FIGURE 3 
Taxpayer Cost per Retained Homeowner 
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pay for health care for a year for 20 kids. It is worth noting that some of the homeowners who 
would have stayed in their house even without this plan would benefit from having lower monthly 
mortgage payments as a result of this plan.   
 
If taxpayers lose in these plans, and homeowners do not necessarily gain, then the question that 
should be asked is, “who gets the money?” The answer is that the mortgage holders will collect more 
money in a situation where the government has stepped in to guarantee mortgages than if it does 
not. The losses that the government would bear in each of the default scenarios illustrated in Figure 
2 would be losses incurred by the mortgage holders in the absence of government intervention. In 
short, the sort of plan laid by OTS is likely to transfer billions of dollars from taxpayers to mortgage 
holders, and possibly tens of billions of dollars, while providing little benefit to homeowners. 
 
Of course the assumption that there will be substantial losses depends on the expectation that house 
prices will continue to fall or at least not rise. This seems very likely given the enormous oversupply 
of housing and the sharp cutback in credit availability for homebuyers. While many proponents of 
bailout plans like that developed by the OTS claim that house prices will not continue to fall, most 
of these analysts never saw the housing bubble in the first place. If house prices revert back to their 
trend level, we can anticipate a further real price decline of 20-30 percent, in addition to the 10 
percent price decline that the country has seen to date. In other words, there will continue to be 
much larger losses in the housing market.4  
 
There are ways to help homeowners that do not require large amounts of taxpayer money. For 
example, it is possible to substantially improve the plight of homeowners facing foreclosure by 
offering the option to remain in their homes as long-term renters. Under this “own-to-rent” plan, a 
                                                 
 
4
 See Baker. D. 2007, “Midsummer Meltdown: Prospects for the Stock and Housing Markets,” Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Economic and Policy Research 
[http://www.cepr.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1266] and Baker, D. 2002. “The Run-Up in 
House Prices: Is It Real or Is It Another Bubble?” Washington, D.C.: Center for Economic and Policy Research 
[http://www.cepr.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=405]. 
Subprime Rescue Plans: Backdoor Bank Bailouts   8 
homeowner facing foreclosure could request that the judge handling the foreclosure arrange an 
appraisal to determine the fair market rent.5 The homeowner would then have the option to remain 
in the home as a renter for some substantial period of time. 
 
This own-to-rent option would both provide some security to homeowners, since they could not 
just be thrown out on the streets, but more importantly it would improve their bargaining position 
relative to mortgage holders. Banks are not anxious to become landlords. It is likely that in the vast 
majority of cases, the own-to-rent option would lead to a situation in which the mortgage holder 
negotiated terms that allowed the homeowner to remain in their house as a homeowner. This would 
be an optimal outcome and it would not require any money from taxpayers. 
 
Conclusion 
The proposals currently being circulated to have the government buy up or guarantee mortgage debt 
for homeowners facing foreclosure are likely to benefit banks more than homeowners. Under 
proposals similar to the one developed by OTS, most homeowners aided by the plan would never 
accumulate any equity in their home. Furthermore, they would be paying nearly twice as much in 
monthly housing costs for the period that they stayed in their homes as if they rented a comparable 
unit. While this proposal does little to aid homeowners, it could lead to the transfer of billions of 
dollars, or even tens of billions of dollars from taxpayers to banks. 
 
The current housing crisis was allowed to develop because those in positions of responsibility 
somehow failed to see an $8 trillion housing bubble. This bubble created an average of $110,000 in 
housing bubble wealth for every homeowner in the country, hugely distorting the housing market 
and the economy. It would be unfortunate if the same people who were responsible for this massive 
failure were allowed to compound the economy’s problems with ill-conceived bailout plans that are 
ostensibly are designed to help homeowners, but really only benefit banks and other mortgage 
holders. 
                                                 
 
5
 Baker, D. 2007. “The Subprime Borrower Protection Plan,” Washington, D.C.: Center for Economic and Policy 
Research [http://www.cepr.net/content/view/1274/45/].  
